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SECTION I

INTRODUCTION

Scope of Study

The purpose of this research is to determine the impact of
public financing on the Joint Powers Authority,
The findings and conclusions are based on in-depth interviews
with officials of nine cities in San Bernardino County. The inter

views represented a sampling of the city managers, directors of
finance, and councilman.

This research paper not only contains opinions from those

public officials elected or appointed to the public sector positions,
but also attempts to measure the attitude of the public as to their

feelings towards revenue funding through the vehicle of the Joint
Powers Authority.

A sampling interview was conducted among the general public
in the nine cities considered in the basic inquiry.

The cities con

sidered were; Ontario, Fontana, Upland, Montclair, Chino, Colton,
Victorville, San Bernardino, and Redlands.
These cities were selected because of the commonality of pur

pose and the general demographic characteristics within each of the
cities, all growing and experiencing the same rate of expansion.

Although some cities may now have a smaller percentage of minori
ties, the integration processes in the past five years indicate what in
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the future may be a more uniform demographic development.
All the cities selected for review are making similar efforts to

develop a business climate which would make it inviting for a busi
ness or industry to settle in their respective areas.

During the course of this study, a review will be made as to
how Revenue Sharing, Inter-governmental Transfer System, and

Regional Gbvernments may have influenced some Joint Powers
Authorities in San Bernardino County.

SECTION II

JOINT POWERS AUTHORITY - WHAT IS IT?

One of the great problems facing state and federal governments

today is taxation, its limitations by law, and its rejection by the
voters.

The requirements as a result of the population increase in this
state are vast and varied; i.e., schools, water systems, sewer sys

tems, flood controls, electric works, airports, harbors, police and
fire stations, administration buildings, and park and recreation
facilities. All these cost millions and some way to finance them had
to be created and developed.

There is an increasing number of people who are voting "no"

on any bond issue, no matter how meritorious. Thus the public
official knows that taxpayers are less likely to support general obli

gation bond^ issues because they add to the tax burden. These same
public officials also know that the majority of the voters need and
demand certain services from the state, county, arid local govern

ments, examples of which were noted earlier. This dilemma has

faced the public officials for the past twenty-five years and it is
interesting to note how it has been treated and to a large extent, suc
cessfully encountered.

One of the biggest problems facing the public officials when

financing is required to issue bonds is the State-required two-thirds
3
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voter approval for general obligation bonds.

The two-thirds requirement was imposed in 1879 after a period

of municipal financing disasters brought on by the extravagant
issuance of bonds for internal improvements. In recent years, how

ever, the two-thirds requirement has beeri seriously questioned.

With the present level of fiscal sophistication of local agencies and
their advisers, such a stringent requirement may no longer be

needed. Its avoidance through the use of a Joint Powers Authority
has been defended on the grounds that requirement of a two-thirds

approval thwarts the will of the majority since it only takes onethird of the voters plus one to defeat any general bond issue. The
elected officials feel they are only carrying out the popular mandate
by financing projects through other means.

As an example, in the past seven years seventy-two percent of
school bond elections have resulted in the failure to win two-thirds

approval in order to issue the hecessary bonds. Had a simple
majority been required, an overwhelming number of elections would
have approved the bonds. (Appendix E)

Attempts to remove the constitutional two-thirds vote provision

by amendment have been unsuccessful. The United States Supreme
Court in 1971 held,"So long as such provisions do not discriminate

' against or authorize discrimination against any identifiable class,
they do not violate the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution."

2
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Such legislative and judicial solutions to overcome the twothirds vote requirement have not proved successful, more and more

loeal agencies have turned to the Joint Powers Authority method of

5

financing to overcome their fiscal problems.
The Joint Powers Authority is a device available to local govern

ments by agreement without the need for further legislation. The
manner of creation permitted, coupled with the power of the Authority
to issue bonds under the Bond Act, offers great flexibility in the field
3

of local financing.

In essence, this code provides for public authority financing as
follows:

A public authority may be created by a joint exercise, of powers

agreement between any two governmental agencies. The authority
may be given the power to perform any function which both parties to

the agreement are empowered to perform and which will be of benefit
to both parties.

The joint exercise of powers agreement sets forth the purpose
for which the authority is formed and the manner in which it will

accomplish this purpose. Again, it should be noted that the purpose
must be one which both parties to the agreement have the power to

accomplish and the accomplishment of this purpose must be of bene
fit to both. The agreement establishes the governing board of the

authority and the manner in which its members are to be named,
sets forth the specific powers granted to the authority and provides
for the conduct of its affairs, including meetings, financial affairs,
and the disposition of its assets.

An agency created under a joint powers agreement may be

given the power to issue revenue bonds. Under the Government Code,
the authority may issue revenue bonds by resolution of its governing
board to finance an exhibition building, a sports stadium or arena, or

any other public building plus, in the case of a county with more than
4,000,000 population, parks, and recreation facilities.
A number of such public authority projects have been initiated

throughout the State of California. In the Colton area, such projects
have been financed by the Ontario-Upland Treatment Plant Authority,

created by the cities of Ontario and Upland; the San Bernardino

Building Authority, created by San Bernardino County and the County
Flood Control and Water Conservation District (County Civic Building,

acquisition); the San Bernardino Public Safety Authority, created by
San Bernardino County and the City of San Bernardino (construction
of North Juvenile Hall); and the Upland Civic Center Authority,

created by the City of Upland and the San Bernardino County (library
and fire station construction). The San Bernardino Public Safety

Authority also plans to sell $7,200,000 of bonds to finance a Central
Jail. The Victorville Joint Powers Authority built a City Hall,

In each case, the project is leased to one or both of the parties

to the joint powers agreement and the bonds to finance the project are

secured by the rental revenues due to the authority under the lease.
When the bonds have been repaid, the lease terminates, and the agency
which has leased the project obtains title to it.
The bonds must be retired within forty years or less.

There is no legal limitation as to the amount of bonds which may
be issued by an authority. However, in actual practice, the amount
of bonds which can be successfully offered for sale is limited by the
amount of rent which the lessor of the project is able to pay. One

factor affecting the marketability of the bonds is the maximum tax

which can be levied by the lessor to raise funds to meet the annual

rental payment securing the bonds. However, revenues from any
available source can be used to pay the rent.

The financing is developed in the following manner for a project
4

to be used by a city:

a) A joint exercise of powers agreement creating the public
authority is executed by the city and another governmental agency.
b) The site for the project is leased by the city to the authority

by means of a ground lease. The term of the ground lease is for a
period extending past the final maturity date of the bonds. If the site
is already owned by the city, it may be leased to the authority for a
nominal rent of $1, If the site is to be acquired as part of the project,

the ground lease may provide for the authority to pay the city an
advance rent for the site in an amount equal to the purchase price.

The city uses the advance rent to purchase the site. Funds to pay the
advance rent are obtained by the authority from bond proceeds,

c) The completed project is leased back to the city by means of
a building facilities' sublease. This lease extends for approximately
the same period as the ground lease,. It provides for the authority to

be paid an annual base rental sufficient to meet annual bond service

requirements of the bonds issued by the authority, plus an additional
rental to meet the limited operating expenses of the authority,

d) The authority governing board adopts a resolution providing
for the issuance of the bonds. In the resolution, the authority estab
lishes the terms and conditions of the bond issue and pledges all

rental payments and other revenues to the payment of the bonds. In
order to make the bonds marketable, the resolution establishes cer

tain other safeguards.

e) Because the city may not begin paying rent for the project

until it is completed and ready for use, it is necessary to provide for
interest during construction to be paid from bond proceeds. Usually,
interest is funded for a period of six months past the expected com

pletion date in order to provide for unforeseeable delays.
A reserve fund is established from bond proceeds and main

tained over the life of the bonds to pay principal and interest in case

revenues are insufficient for the purpose in any year. A trust fund

is set Up for an amount to cover expenses for one year. These funds
are available in the event an emergency should arise and a normal

payment cannot be made. In the event that no emergency should occur,
then the funds are used to make the payment for the final year.

Various types of insurance protection are afforded to avoid
default on the bonds in case the building is damaged to the extent the

city can no longer occupy and pay rent for it. In addition to the nor
mal insurance protection, it is usually necessary to provide business

interruption (rental) insurance and insurance against earthquakes.
Since the authority receives no rental revenues from the city until the

project is completed, funds to pay these insurance premiums must be
included in the authority bond issue. After completion of the project,

the city pays the authority an additional rental to cover the insurance

premiums, or in lieu of this, the city may obtain the insurance itself
on behalf of the authority.

A trustee is usually appointed to receive, administer, and dis
burse all of the funds of the authority. Appointment of a trustee,

which is usually a nationally-known bank, gives the bondholder an
additional measure of assurance that the funds of the authority will be

9

properly applied and will be available when required to meet bond
service.

General criticism of this process is that it does not allow the

taxpayers to participate and make a choice to exercise their normal
right to vote on bonded indebtedness used to fund capital improye- ,

ments.^

SECTION III

BASIC BACKGROUND

For decades, the prime source of money for capital improve
ments has been derived from the sale of general obligation bonds by

the political agency responsible for its construction. Taxpayers
normally have a right to vote on bonded indebtedness used to fund
capital improvements. The authority to issue these bonds is the
result of two-thirds of all voters favoring the issuance of such bonds.

General obligation bonds are those for which debt service (which
includes interest and redemption payments) is either paid from the
General Fund or the General Fund is pledged as a guarantee against a

possible default in payment from program revenues.

There are three categories of general obligation bonds: 1)
General Fund Bonds--those bonds for which the debt service is fully

paid from the General Fund; 2) Partially Self-Liquidating Bonds-
those bonds for which the debt service is partially paid from the pro

ject or program revenues and the remainder from the General Fund,
and 3) Self-Liquidating Bonds--those bonds for which the debt service

is entirely paid from the project or program revenues. If project or

program revenues are insufficient to cover the costs of the partially
self-liquidating bonds or self-liquidating bonds, the full faith and
credit of the state is pledged to make payment from the General Fund.
The Joint Exercise of Powers Act of 1921, Government Code
10

Sections 6500 et seq., authorizes California public agencies to enter
into contracts with other public agencies whereby an agreement is

made to exercise jointly any powers specified in the contract which

are held by all parties. Contracts may be entered into with the
federal or state government, the government of any adjoining state,
a county, city, public district or public corporation, any agency or

department of these entities. The agreement may be administered,
by one or more of the parties to the contract, a commission consti
tuted pursuant to the agreement, or a person, firm, or corporation
designated in the agreement.

In addition to other powers, any agency, commission or board

provided for by a joint powers agreement pursuant to Article 1, if
such entity has the power to acquire, construct, maintain or operate:

(a) An exhibition building or any other place for holding fairs
or exhibitions for the display of agricultural, livestock, industrial,
or other products;

(b) A coliseum, a stadium, a sport arena or sports pavilion or

other building for holding sport events, athletic contests, contests of
skill, exhibitions, spectacles and other public meetings;
(c) Any other public buildings;

may issue revenue bonds pursuant to this article to pay the cost and
expenses of acquiring or constructing a structure or structures or

facility or facilities which may include any or all of said purposes.
Local governments have justified the use of Joint Powers

Agencies to construct various capital improvements on the grounds
that the state constitutional requirement for a two-thirds vote on

general obligation bonds is too restrictive. On many occasions,

local bond issues have reached votes substantially in excess of a

majority, but have failed to receive the required two-thirds vote.
Therefore, a. Joiht Powers Agency

an alternative

financing method for various public improvemehts.

The League of Gaiifornia Gities ha^^

legislature

that it would support iegislation which would prbhibit the use and
limit of Joint Powers Agencies if the iegislature, in turni would pro

pose an amendntent to Article XfXl of the State Gpnstitution to lowet ^ )
the vote requirement on general obligation bonds to a rnajority.
The Galifornia Real Estate Association and other so-called

"taxpayers" groups have consistently opposed any such constitutional
amendment.

The Joint Powers Agencies were responsible for the building and

development of water treatment plants and flood control development
and sewage facilities, which were regional in scope' as well as local
city-county buildings, parks, and pools.

;

Prior to the development of this regional concept, the grouping
of the cities which are the subject of this study got along for many

years as a cluster of little settlements, each with its own character
and each with its own self-imposed isolationist thinking and attitude.

They finally realized that the regional approach to major problem
solving had become the dominant method for effectively developing the
whole area.

These cities became aware that they had similar prob

lems and common interests, They did not have to sacrifice community

pride and identity, nor abandon competitive zeal. They then began to
look beyond their community and examine which of their concerns
transcended community and might best be viewed as regional.

This system of financing was creative and effective until about
1970 when nation-wide economic recessions hit sortie of the big

industries in California very hard; i.e., aerospace, shipbuilding, and
auto assembly plants.

Simultaneously, the taxpayer who becanie painfully aware that
his taxes were rising with each passing year became; rsluGtaat to vote

for any revenue bond, school bond, or tax override. During this

period of five years, 1971 to 1976, a total of sixty rtioney bills were
submitted to the voters by the county school Ipoa-rds in San Bernardino

County with only 28% passing and 72% failing. The general revenue
bonds Suffered the same fate. (Appendix E)

;;

The elected officials and city managers reluctantly went to
Joint Powers for financing of bonds. The electorate suddenly became

aware that they were being left out of the normal political process.

In the past five years, only one city (Chino) has resorted to the
use of the Joint Powers, "Chino Civic Center Authority," which was ^
financed in the amount of $4,500,000.

At the same time that there developed a reluctance to use the

Joint Powers Agency by all of the nine cities studied, a program of
federal revenue sharing and other grants and aid from the federal

government became a better source for money. Certainly it was
easier and cheaper to acquire.

Total grants from the federal government during the fiscal

year 1975-76 amounted to $13,274,851 to nine cities. Grants to total
revenue amounted frorn 4.7 to 27.8 percent of the total budget for the

respective cities. (Appendix A)

■ 14: ■

The eities were recipients of federal revenue sharing, block

grants, FAU (Federal Aid to Urban), Comprehensive Training Act,
and the Public Works Bill. (Appendices B, C, and D)

On 20 May 1977, President Carter signed two bills into law
which are designed to provide 1, 100,000 jobs, mainly among con
struction workers and young people.

: One bill authorizes spending $4,000,000,000 on public works

projects, such as repa.irs to and Construction of schools and water
works.

The other bill, part of Carter's economic stimulus program, is

a $20,000,000,000 appropriation rheasure, including $4,000,000,000
for public works projects, $1, OOO, OOO,000 for 200,000 youth jobs,
$8,000, OOO, 000 for public service jobs over the next 18 months for

persons who have had problems in finding work, and $631,000,000 in
general aid for state and local governments.

By the $4,000,000,000 public works bill, the Congress hopes to
create 300,000 jobs in the construction trades and 300,000 jobs re
lated to them. The $20,000,dOO,000 appropriations bill included
$4,000, 000, 000 to fund the program.

The public works bill extends and expands a $2,000, 000, 000

public works bill signed last year by President Gerald R. Ford, which
created 141,000 jobs directly in the constructioh trades.

On May 23, 1977, President Carter signed a bill for water

delivery systems to be funded in the amount of $235,000,000 for the
western states. General Revenue Sharing and other grants when
introduced into cities' revenue pictures can be additive to general
funds or substitutive for funds that would have btherwise been raised
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from revenue sources. It is for this reason that raising money

through Joint'Powers has become less important.

In order to raise the GRS grant, some cities have taken advan

tage of a bill passed by the California legislature, A report, dated
30 June 1975, on the effects of revenue sharing prepared at the
University of California, Riverside, states:
"We found one significant development regarding special districts
which has occurred as a result of the tax effort provisions of the
revenue sharing bill. In the first year of GRS, the California
State Legislature passed a bill which created a mechanism through
which cities can now get revenue sharing credit for the property
taxes paid to various kinds of special districts. Under its provi
sions, a city, by resolution of its council, may pay to such special
districts an amount of money equal to the amount the special dis
trict would derive from the imposition of its tax on all the property
within the incorporated limit of the city. In turn, the city council,
in order to generate the necessary funds, establishes a city tax
rate in the amount equal to the amount of the rate set by the

governing board of the special district, and the tax is formally
collected for the city rather than for the district. The result is an
increase in the city's tax effort and, therefore, in the amount of
revenue sharing money received, or, to put it another way, the
cities are penalized less in the GRS formula for having some of
their functions performed by special districts. In each case, the
council may decide each year which arrangement it wishes to make,
since the legislation allows the authorization to be made on a year
to-year basis.
The cities have also discovered an opportunity, which has existed
for some years in the State Water Code, to make the same kinds
of arrangements with water districts.
Some cities in the study have taken advantage of these possibilities
and have thereby increased their revenue sharing amounts. On the
other hand, many cities have not taken advantage of the act. One
city in Southern California, for example, has no property tax;
however, its residents pay property tax to seven special districts
or service areas: a water district, a sanitation district, a fire
district, a street lighting district, a parks and recreation district,
a flood control district, and an airport service area. The city,
although informed of the nev/ law by the Local Agency Formation
Commission, has decided against action to return these functions

to the city in order to take advantage of the tax effort portion of
the GRS formula. In this case, political rather than economic
considerations are the deciding factors. The councilrhen wish to
be able to say that the city has no property tax.

16

With this as background, the question arises, how Revenue

Sharing, Intergovernmental Transfer System, and Regional Govern
ments may have influenced some Joint Powers Authorities,

SECTION IV

INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFER SYSTEM, REVENUE SHARING
AND REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS

Intergovernmental Transfer

The primary form of intergovernmental cooperation is through
the transfer of payments. They are directed at specified purposes,

usually subject to a measure of supervision and review by the grant

ing government. Recent years have seen a substantial and everincreasing flow of funding from federal to state and local governments.
The transfer of financial assistance from state to local governments
has also flourished.

The federal intergovernmental transfer system has continually

grown since the early 19th century. The early grants financed by the
sale of federal lands were used for road construction and later to

establish and operate the land grant colleges. The land grant system

was a major factor in the development of the rail system in the letter
half of the 1800's. Supervision of these grants was relatively loose

but still significant. The few conditions attached to them governed
the mode of disposition of the lands and the manner in which the pro
ceeds were to be used for purposes specified.

The amount of the grants was rather modest until the 1930's,

when the desperate financial conditions of the state and localities led
to the development of a great variety of grants to help finance programs
17
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in education, health, welfare, transportation, housing, and other
fields.

Federal assistance has increased dramatically in the last three

decades. National aid, in absolute terms, has risen from $2.2
billion in 1950 to $60.5 billion in 1977. To put these figures in better

perspective, national government aid now represents 16% of the total

national budget and nearly 22% of the national domestic budget.^ For
many decades, almost all of this funding had gone to the state govern
ment, but by 1973, 25% went to local governments. The states receive
nearly a quarter of their revenue from the federal government.

1

Local government receives less than 10% of its revenue from the
federal government, but this does not include state aid which is funded
g

by the federal government and passed on to local governments.
The federal aid has almost exclusively gone to support basic

areas: education, income security, health and hospitals, , and high

ways. More recently, revenue sharing could be added to another
significant contribution.
Fiscal difficulties of state and locaT governments caused by

uncontrollable and controllable factors encompassing economic and

political considerations have led to their greater financial dependency.
Uncontrollable circumstances that face lower levels of government

are regional income differences and intergovernrnental spillovers
that take place whenever any portion of the costs or benefits of a
public service that is provided in a jurisdiction is realized by resi
dents of another jurisdiction. The degree of spillover may be cate

gorized by the far-reaching importance of a service in a region.
Education and air pollution have a greater spillover than neighborhood

'■ parks..

A cbntrollable factor which interrelates with spillovers con

cerns the jurisdictional financial pbsturs. State governiTients rely

nripre upon inconne taxes while local rely significantly upon sales and
property taxes. These taxes are more slpwly affected by the changing
eCpnbmiC conditions. The inelasticity of these state and local revenue
sources (property tax) render state and loCal fiscal measures as

unsuited to cover the elasticity in the demand for services. State and

local governments have also ehcountered another difficulty in finaneTng programs. This problem arises from the limited success of

gaining voter approvdl to establish new tax bases or of rate increases
on present tax bases. (Appendix E)
The elastic ihcome tax structure of the federal government has

thus resulted in a greater revenue capacity but not the parallel advan

tage to subordinate governments in providing many governmental
services. The superior fiscal capacity can thus be used to entice or

persuade lower levels of government to provide given services. The
federal government has engaged in financial assistance to ameliorate
societal discrepancies. Thus, in reality, federal involvement has
usually served to stimulate the states' exercise of their own powers,

encouraging a great expansion of the scope of state governmental

operations.

Such was the case with the construction of the inter

state highway system. This phenomena is becoming more prevalent
at the local level with the increase in direct federal-local assistance.

Federal transfers have striven for the redistribution of income
and the increase of service levels provided, thus enabling some

localities to rise above substandard service production levels. In

■
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3iddition to decreasing these inequalities, the Hoover Gommission in
1949 declared that grants had raised the leveT of all aided services
without transferring functions entirely to the hational governrhent.
However, in 19'78, the Hoover Commission's conclusion would be

violently disputed by local and state governnients,
The extent of federal control over these intergovernmental

transfers as well as the bypassing of state government to directly
finance local governments have been areas of debate. These issues
have influenced the composition of the method of transfer. The varia
tions of these tools are reflected in the mood of elected officials by

the degree of federal control required, as well as by the segments of
society served by grants.

;

There are numerous transfer tools available to enhance the

state and local fiscaL outlook, such as vacating specific revenue

sdurces, tax suppleraents, tax deductions, and tax 'credits. Also to be
included are shared revenue, tax offsets, and grants or contracts

awarded to public and private applicants, such as federal grants to
universities.

Of the transfer tools utilized, the most frequently used,

yet controversial, are the instruments of the direct transfer of funds.
Included in this group is the most recently implemented transfer sys
tem; revenue-sharing whose full impact has not been fully realized.
Another set of tools is the more established, categorical and block

grants which can be divided into projectj matching fund, or formula
allocation approaches.

Categorical grants are money transfers to lower levels of
government made without conditions of repayment, but exchanged for
specifically-defined purposes detailing the use of funds and the

21

expected benefits. This is intended to result in the elimination of
unsound project proposals. Examples of acceptable purposes are a

particular type of highway or assistance for graduate programs in

speech therapy. Today over 95% of all national grants-in-aid fall into

this class. ^^
Categorical grants enable the higher level of government to
maintain control over the expenditures of lower levels of government,

greatly increasing the chance that programs considered important to
the national interest are initiated and implemented. They permit the

federal government to tailor its assistance to those activities that
have the largest spillover effects- Inadequate education, health,
anti-poverty, and anti-pollution programs in one area will mean costs
inflicted on the rest of the country.

12

To ensure the proper allocation of funds, the federal government
maintains controls over the use of the funds. Recipient agencies must

supply some of their resources to support the program. These
agencies must, in addition, administer the program according to
prescribed standards.

The grants can be classified into two groups: 1) grant funds
earmarked for expenditures on programs or subprograms, and 2)
grant funds earmarked for expenditure on specified inputs to programs

or subprograms. The first group would be those which are restricted
to particular programs; e. g., unemployment, school lunches, etc.

The second group would be those restricted to particular kinds of
expenditures related to a specified program or department; e. g.,
hospital construction, sewage disposal, equipment, etc.

13

Categorical grants are criticized for being focused too

22

narrowly, in that jurisdictions can only spend monies for specified

types of projects. Much concern has centered on the operation and
impact of the grants-in-aid program. Critics have expressed fears
that these grants skew many local priorities.

Categorical grants have been criticized as making budget plan

ning difficult because many proposals may await judgment for months.
In addition, criticism has been leveled at the time and expertise

required to complete the complex application process. State and local
governments that are well-organized and staffed will win the project

grants. Yet they may have a relatively low index of need for the pro
jects or have a relatively high index of fiscal capacity with which to
meet their needs..

It is alleged that the federal carrot leads recipients to under
take activities that are not in their own best interest and that require

ments are frequently inconsistent with the social or economic prob
lems.

Furthermore, agencies must pay some political price in

order to receive its benefits.

As the number of categorical grants increased after World War

II, administrators began to show concern about the inability to trans
fer federal aid from one closely-related field to another. This

resulted in the creation of the block grant. The block grant is funded
for a broad functional area. The block grant at the federal level was

implemented as an instrument to consolidate the numerous categori

cal grant programs. These groupings lead to greater flexibility with
specified programs and a more streamlined application process.
The 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act and the

Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 are examples of
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major block grants. CETA is another example of such a program in
which diverse manpower programs were greatly reduced. CETA

represents the legislative compromise between the centralists--those
favoring concentration of power in Washington and the proponents of
special manpower revenue sharing.

15

The consolidation and decen

tralization of programs appear,to represent the major dichotomy
between categorical and block grants.

The great appeal for these grants has stemmed from fear by
state and local governments that an increase in categorical grants
will result in the concentration of power in the federal government.

By instituting broader categories, the federal government is demon
strating more confidence in the competency of lower levels of govern
ment.

Criticism of the block grant has centered on the reservations

expressed by federal officials that subordinate levels of government
are not able to address national priorities. The broader parameters
render less efficiency in the distribution of monies.

Other critics pointed out that while state and local officials may

gain under block grants, much of the original purpose of categoric

grants-in-aid will be lost. That is, block grants will provide stimulus
for particular types of functions, narrowly defined. In addition, appli
cation has proven to be very difficult because of the opposition of
federal and state bureaucracies, of interest groups who wanted ear

marked grants, of segmented congressional committees, and by frag
mented program administration.

Project as well as formulation and matching fund allocation

approaches can be applied to both categorical and block grants. These
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components of grants-in-aid significantly impact the thrust of the
many federally funded programs.

The federal government can apply different Congressionallyset formulas to the distribution of grants. The amount of the grant

might vary with the unit size of the recipient. The subsidy does not
necessarily have to be fixed but it can vary inversely with the finan
cial ability of the jurisdictions.

Matching grant funds which apply only to the portion of expendi
ture that exceeds a specific minimum level are mainly designed to

encourage subordinate governments to initiate and implement new

programs. Grants for the entire amount can tend to weaken the state
or local responsibility motive. Grants without fund requirements are
related to the input or performance of the program. To measure

efficiency, greater emphasis is being placed on output or the perfor
mance standard.

Project grants are now matching fund grants which are distinc
tive from the formula grants in that a subordinate government must

prepare a detailed application for a project grant. Money is allocated
among all eligible recipients according to a plan established by law
or regulation. Certain Congressional guidelines are outlined, with
the discretion for allocation of project grants left to a national admini
strator who decides the merit of each application.

Project grants are directed to closely defined objectives. These

grants are made available for innovative programs and research, not
simply for supportive endeavors. In the mid 60's, more money was
allocated for formula grants, but the project grants were actually
greater in total number.
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The impact of categorical and block grants has been unques

tionably significant. The proliferation of these grants has generally
distorted American federalism. Since the inception of grants, the
control of these transfer tools has vacillated between centralized and

decentralized. The early sixties reflected a more centralized

approach, but by the late sixties and early seventies, decentralization
became evident. In pointing out this decentralizing phenomenon, .

revenue sharing must be acknowledged as an integral part of this
process.

Revenue Sharing

Revenue sharing has gone beyond block grants, by not requiring

matching, maintenance of effort, or prior project approval. Funds
are disbursed to the states on the basis of population, per capita

income, urbanized population, tax effort, and income tajc collection.
The funds are allocated to state arid local governments without

"strings" attached; however, certain general priorities must be met.
These areas include public safety, recreation, etc.

The primary purpose of revenue sharing was to offset fiscal
drag in the economy of the nation and in equalizing the fiscal position

of wealthy and poor governments. Overwhelming criticism of the

program has been that the revenue was spent on public safety instead
of on anticipated social service programs, that citizens have had

little input in the delegation of funding, and that governments have
been provided revenue unequivocably.

Regardless of the transfer tool, whether it be revenue sharing,
block, or categorical grants, the impact of each tool has had a major
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influence on all four areas of American government--federal, state,.
coTUXty, and local.

Regional Governments

Many political scientists, conservationists, legislators, and
local officials have pointed out that California's development over the
last three decades has epitomized what has become loiown as urban

sprawl. Traditionally, state laws and community practices in the
formation and alteration of local governmental boundaries and juris
dictions have followed the course of least resistance.

What the majority of local people desired, they were able to get.

Thus, in suburban areas, it has been easier to incorporate new cities

and form special districts than to expand the boundaries of existing

cities through annexation or to form regional governments. The effect
has been to satisfy subdivision developers and "home rule" advocates

at the expense of dealing effectively with government problems which
cross city and county boundaries.

Most of what passes for regional government in California today

is based upon the Joint Exercise of Powers Act of 1921. That act
permits local government (cities and counties) to carry out common
functions through the creation of Joint Powers agencies. The popu

larity of such agencies among local officials is due, in part, to their
flexibility. A Joint Powers agency may exercise all the powers and
duties of its constituent local governments or it may be limited to
single purpose.

Because of the great interest of regional government shown in
the San Francisco Bay Area, the Association of Bay Area Governments
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was formed in 1961 to provide a vehicle for the development of

regional planning for nine bay area counties. In 1961, forty-two
cities and five counties signed a Joint Powers agreement, setting up
ABAG as "a forum for discussion and study of metropolitan area

problems of mutual interest and concern to the cities and counties of
San Francisco area and for the development of policy and action
recommendations."

As a Joint Powers agency, it had no binding powers. However,

during the 1960's and 70's, its role has grown significantly, largely
as a result that it began to serve as the regional planning agency res

ponsible for the distribution of federal funds for programs in housing,
law enforcement, recreation, and pollution control, refuse disposal,

and shoreline development. In 1966 and 1969, there were efforts to

expand its authority as a regional home rule vehicle with tax and bond
capacity, but this was blocked by the state legislature.

During this period, there were a number of federal actions

taken to encourage regional planning and program administration. As
the number of federal grant programs multiplied, several federal

agencies sought to reduce the number of local jurisdictions and plan
ning districts with which they had to deal.

For many years, the League of California Cities opposed any

thing that looked at all like a step toward metropolitan or regional
government. The League openly stated that special districts that
could be controlled by city officials were the only agencies to be
trusted to deal with regional problems. In recent years, however,

the League's position has changed considerably. In January of 1971,
the League formally adopted a policy statement calling for legislation
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to create regional organizations throughout the state. These organi

zations, according to the League's policy statement, should serve as
"umbrella" organizations for all other regional agencies, operating

with "limited powers and functions with reference to the operation of
regional services" and with "such regulatory and taxing powers as
necessary to carry out the regional functions." Significantly, the

governing bodies of such organizations "shall be composed entirely of
city and county elected officials." (Even this was too much for the
Los Angeles City Council, however, which promptly went on record
opposing the League's policy.)

,

The County Supervisors Association of California, another long
time opponent of regional government, has also moved somewhat
closer to accommodation, but evidently with,great reluctance. Noting

that several "regional government approaches" to environmental con
trol had been proposed during the 1971 session of the legislature, the
association, meeting in October 1971, adopted a resolution stating
that "when it is necessary to form regional organizations to solve

problems of a regional nature...it is in the best interest of the people
of California to compose the governing,body of such regional orga.niza
tions entirely of locally elected officials from units of general-purpose

governments--thus assuring local responsiveness and public visibility
and avoiding the needless superimposition of a new level of govern

ment."^^
It appears that one of the great fears by existing agencies is

thjat regional organizations, as has been proposed in California II
which would divide the state into ten regions, would culminate in the
development of another layer of government. This plus civic pride

and, in some cases, self-aggrandizement are central to the issue of.
workable regional governments.

SECTION V

CONCLUSION

The impact of public financing on the Joint Powers Authority
can best be determined as a result of a random survey, scientific and

literary research performed in the past year.
In a random survey conducted in the following cities: Ontario,
Colton, Fontana, Upland, Montclair, Chino, Victorville, San
Bernardino, and Redlands during the spring of 1977, seventy-five

people were interviewed on the subject of Joint Powers Authority. The
survey asked for answers to questions related to taxes and financing
of programs through such agencies.

The results are significant for they reflect the attitudes of a
cross-section of business men, members of a profession, working

class, and city managers, councilmen, and finance directors of nine
cities in San Bernardino County. By overwhelming majorities, all
interviewed were concerned about high taxes and impersonal govern
ment even at the local level.

Question; Do you know what a Joint Powers Authority is?
65% said "no;" 35% said "yes"
Question: Do you believe taxes are too high?

99% said "yes;" 1% said "no"
Question: Do you know what an obligation bond is?
65% said "no;" 35% said "yes"
30
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After an explanation was made as to what an obligation bond was and
how a Joint Powers Authority m.ay use them,to fina.nce progra.nas, the;
following questions were asked:

Question: Do you believe you should have an opportunity to vote for
or against an obligation bond to finance a public authority
program?

90% said "yes;" 5% said "no;" 5% were "undecided"
It is interesting to note that the five percent who said "no" were
management employees in local government.

Question: Do you believe that it is possible to get two-thirds of the
majority voting to vote "yes" on a bond at the present
time?

95% said "no;" 5% "undecided"

To the question asked of those who are management employees
in local government:

Do you believe you would favor financing a program through Joint
Powers Authority by directly selling obligation bonds without asking
consent of the electorate?

100% said "no"

Some comments made by members of local government were:

Although I am in complete accord with the objectives of the Joint
Powers Agreement, I would hesitate to use the financing built into
such authority.

Joint Powers agreements are one aspect of the entire issue of local
financing. The subject is a sensitive one, but it had its use.
Government grants and revenue sharing have made the sale of
obligation bonds unnecessary.

We used Joint Powers financing one time and we are very proud of
the results, but I don't think we would use such financing today.

A militant one-third plus one of the voters can control the sale of
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obligation bonds and thwart the will of the majority.
I believe one man was speaking the thoughts of many when he
said:

The voter feels isolated, frustrated, and becomes very defiant at

the polls when asked to vote for an obligation bond. His vote is
no, no matter how meritorious the cause.

It is becoming very apparent that regional approach to govern
ment and its vehicle, a Joint Powers agency, is expanding not only in

California, but throughout the country. The financing of such agencies
has been thriving with the influx of federal funds with the following

effects upon Joint Powers Authority and other measures of control and
fiscal management:

a) Without revenue grants, sharing programs would have been
eliminated or cut in scope.

b) By financing on-going programs with revenue sharing or
intergovernment transfer, it frees the jurisdictions own resources to
permit a reduction in tax rates or an avoidance of a tax increase,
c) By substituting revenue sharing, grants, and intergovern
ment transfers, borrowing and use of general obligations bonds, in ,
many cases, are not required,

d) Grants-in-aid and intergovernmental transfers are used by
Joint Powers Authorities in regional planning or financing of many

functions, as water resources, sewage control, air pollution, and
highways,
e) Where Joint Powers Authority was formerly used at a local

level; i, e,, city, district, and county, revenue sharing grants-in-aid

and intergovernmental transfers will now support capital improve
ments.

33

This innovative form of public financing which we discussed has

given local authorities and regional authorities the flexibility to mani
pulate and manage funds derived from normal tax sources, which
ability they never had before.

The great proliferation of federal and state grants-in-aid,

including revenue sharing as well as tax sharing and other inter

governmental transfers, and the development of regional concepts
have resulted in a generally cooperative relationship among all

parties. While these intergovernmental relationships have flourished
at all levels relieving the financial burden incurred by lower levels of

government, concern has been prompted by the unparalleled power
that the federal government conceivably could impose on subordinate
governments.

Many benefits accrue to the state through such federal inter
vention. The federal programs strengthen the ability of the state to

deal with problems generated by those enterprises within their boun
daries. Thus, in reality, federal involvement has served to stimulate
the state's exercise of its own powers, encouraging a great expansion

of the scope of state governmental operations. In some cases, the
actual fear of federal involvement has led to the reorganization and
improvements of state programs.
In summation, it can be said that the impact on local public

financing in the form of intergovernmental transfers, grants, revenue
sharing, and the necessity for planning on a regional basis is now

having a cumulation impact in popularizing the use of Joint Powers
Authorities. As long as this source of funds continues to be available,
the sale of general obligation bonds will not be resorted to in San
Bernardino to finance a public facility.

APPENDIX A

PERCENTAGE OF GRANTS RELATED TO INCOME

1975-76
Total

Normal

Grants

Revenue

Total

%

879,036

$17,825,802

$18,704,838

4.7

Fontana

537,555

3,073, 177

3,610,732

14. 9

Upland

644,438

7,998,405

8,642,843.

1, 080,000

5,250,000

6, 330, 000

17. 1

Chino

482,000

7,700,000

8, 182, 000

5. 9

Colton

659, 166

2,771,400

3,430,566

19. 2

Victorville

304,126

1,638,972

1,943,098

15. 7

San Bernardino

7,526,299

21,837,646

29, 363,945

25.6

Redlands

1, 162,231

3, 025,044

4, 187,275

27.8

Ontario

Montclair

Total Grants

$

7.5

$13,274,851

Source: Finance Directors
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of the above cities

APPENDIX B

CITY OF ONTARIO

Population 66, 000
Revenue

Other

Normal

Sharing

Grants

Revenue

1975-76

$668,980

$386,358

$17,825,802

1974-75

627,736

160,592

12,722,995

1973-74

790,311

405,874

11,972,256

1972-73

700,517

486,840

11, 140,556

108,906

10, 034,915

1971-72

-

CITY OF FONTANA

Population 21,000
Revenue

Other

Normal

Sharing

Grants

Revenue

1975-76

$195,759

$841,796

$ 3, 073, 177

1974-75

184,408

303,077

2,814,021

1973-74

163, 150

131,914

2,602, 104

1972-73

182,884

201,583

2,347,126

1971-72

-

115,627

1,995,388

CITY OF UPLAND

Population 33,000
Revenue

Other

Normal

Sharing

Grants

Revenue

1975-76

$220,000

$424,438

$ 7,998,405

1974-75

209,427

181,046

6,397,535

1973-74

199,982

168,984

5,474,220

1972-73

193,465

154,302

4,798,582

1971-72

-

60,226

3,838,486

Source: Finance Directors

of the above cities
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APPENDIX C

:

CITY OF MONTCEAIR

Population 23,000
Revenue

Other

Normal

Sharing

Grants

Revenue

1975-76

$290,000

$790,000

$ 5,250,000

1974-75

290,000

360,000

5,250,000

1973-74

290,000

250,000

4,500,000

1972-73

290,000

100,000

3, 300,000

1971-72

290,000

85,000

3, 100,000

; CITY OF CHINO

Population 21,000
Revenue

Other

Normal

Sharing

Grants

Revenue

1975-76

$300,000

$182,000

$ 7,700,000

1974-75

271,000

165,000

5,800,000

1973-74

239,000

127,000

5, 300,000

1972-73

243,000

220,000

3,800,000

1971-72

160,000

150,000

3,600,000

CITY OF COLTON

Population 21,000
Revenue

Other

Normal

Sharing

Grants

Revenue

1975-76

$322,932

$336,134

$ 2,771,400

1974-75

359,789

218,842

2, 350,000

1973-74

344,544

202,133

2,619,500

1972-73

336,577

591,791

2,437,000

19tl-72

2,502,400
■ ■ Source: Finance Directors
of the above cities
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APPENDIX D

CITY OF VICTGRVILLE

Population 13,000
Revenue

Other

Sharing

Grants

Normal
Revenue

1975-76

$124,884

$179,242

$ 1,638,972

1974-75

118, 377

104,722

1,492,651

1973-74

107,041

30,124

1, 334,213

1972-73

117, 184

111,350

1, 058, 376

1971-72

-

65,935

911,615

CITY OF SAN BERNARDINO

Population 108,000
Revenue

Sharing

Other
Grants

Normal
Revenue

1975-76

$1,857,643

$5,668,656

$21,837,646

1974-75

1,913, 128

2,238,036

19,605,271

1973-74

1,892,369

1,717,588

22,831,731

1972-73

2,541, 125

1, 147,164

20,977,842

2,225,793

18,551,233

1971-72

CITY OF REDBANDS

Population 36,000
Revenue

Other

Normal

Sharing

Grants

Revenue

1975-76

$324,629

$837,602

$ 3,025, 344

1974-75

319,830

254,795

3, 172,630

1973-74

310,919

32,002

3, 144,949

1972-73

350,203

138,720

2,774,031

79,812

2,641, 173

1971-72

Source: Finance Directors
of the above cities
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APPENDIX E

SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICTS
Voters' Response to Bond Issues, etc.
Bonds
Year

Elections

Passed

Failed

1971-72

6

1

5

1972-73

5

2

3

1973-74

2

b

2

1974-75

3

2

1

1975-76

7

4

3

23

9

14

Total

39% Passed

61% Failed
Tax Override

1971-72

2

1

1

1972-73

4

1

3

1973-74

4

2

2

1974-75

6

1

5

1975-76

5

0

5

21

5

16

Total

24% Passed
76% Failed
Lease Purchase

1973-74

9

2

7

1974-75

6

0

6

1975-76

1

1

1

16

3

13

Total

19% Passed
81% Failed
Grand Total

17

60

28% Passed
72% Failed
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FOOTNOTES

^Revenue bonds have been traditionally defined as bonds which
are secured by a "special fund." These bonds are for specific pro
jects in which only the revenue generated from the program is
pledged for payment of the bonds. General obligation bonds are those
for which debt service (which includes interest and redemption pay- ,

ments) is either paid from the General Fund or the General Fund is

pledged as a guarantee against possible default in payment from
program revenues.
2

Gordon vs. Luce, 403 U.S. 1.

California Government Code, Sec. 6547.

^California Government Code, Sec. 6500-6514.
^California Constitution, Article XVI, Sec. 18,■ and"Article XIII,
Sec. 40.

Parris N. Glendening and Mavis Mann Reeves, Pragmatic

Federalism (Pacific Palisades: Palisades Publishers, 1977), p.^152.
James A. Maxwell and J. Richard Aronson, Financing State

arid Local Governments (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,
Publisher, 1977), p. 56.
Q

Robert D. Lee, Jr. and Ronald W. Johnson, Public Budgeting

Systems (Baltimore: University Park Press, 1977), p. 290.

^Daniel J. Elanzar, American Federalism: A View from the
States (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1972), p. 57.

^^Maxwell and Aronson. Financing State and Local Governments,
p. 74.

^^Glendening and Reeves, Pragmatic Federalism, p. 152.
12

Harvey S. Perloff and Richard R. Nathan, eds., Revenue
Sharing and the City (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 15.

^^Werner Z. Hirsch, The Economics of State and Local Govern
ment(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1970), p. 120.

^^Mcixwell and Aronson, Financing State and Local Governments,
39

40

^^Robert L. Lineberry and Ira Sharkansky, Urban Politics and
Public Policy (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1974), p. IT?.

^^Robert McPherson, "CETA - The Basic Assumptions and
Future Prospects," A Collection of Policy Papers for Three Regional
Conferences. A Special Report of the National Commission for

Manpower Policy, Special Report #14(Washington, D.C,: 1976),
p. 210.
California Journal, Vol. 2, No. 7, August 1972, pp. 217-220.
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